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For more than a decade, the bench, bar, and commentators have disagreed
as to whether judges should look to decisions of international and foreign
courts for guidance in resolving disputes that appear in U.S. courts. In 2003,
Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence v. Texas warned darkly that the majority's
citation to foreign and international sources was "[d]angerous dicta" that
risked "impos [ing] foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans."' The next
year, then-Attorney General Alberto Gonzales objected that "[r]eliance on
foreign law threatens to unmoor the court from the proper source of its
authority. '2 Members of Congress echoed those sentiments, some going so far
as to threaten to impeach Justices who relied on such materials.3
As a member of the U.S. Supreme Court for more than two decades, Justice
Stephen Breyer has been a quiet participant in this conversation- drawing
upon decisions of foreign colleagues to enrich his opinions. Now, in his new
book, The Court and the World,4 Justice Breyer offers a full-throated defense of
the practice, arguing that it is not only permissible and desirable but
unavoidable.' New global challenges require renewed cooperation among
judges across state borders. To decide cases in our globalized world, he
contends, judges need to wrestle with foreign and international law. In some
cases, U.S. judges must apply foreign or international law as controlling, not
1. 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting.) (quoting Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, n.*
(2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)).
2. Charles Lane, The High Court Looks Ahead, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2005), http://www
.washingtonpost.con/wp-dyn/content/article,/2oo/l/n/AR2oo51111o1645.htnl [http://
perma.cc/ETH 7 -Z 4V4 ].
3. Tom Curry, A Flap over Foreign Matter at the Supreme Court, NBC NEWS (Mar.
11, 2004), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/ 4 5 o623 2/ns/politics-tom curry/t/flap-over-foreign
-matter-supreme-court [http://perma.cc/6 9 D 9 -5 6Z 4 ].
4. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL
REALITIES (2015).
5. See id. at 236-46.
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merely persuasive, authority.6 In others, U.S. judges must be aware of how
foreign courts have resolved similar issues and consider what effects their
decisions are likely to have in other states. Ultimately, Justice Breyer's
argument is one of pragmatism, not ideology.
As professors who teach, write about, and litigate issues of foreign and
international law, we fully agree with Justice Breyer's central claims. Indeed,
his is a position that would be utterly uncontroversial in almost any other
country. It is a position, moreover, that allows U.S. courts to extend the
influence of U.S. law throughout the world -for judges the world over look to
the decisions of our own courts for insights.
But there is a real-world problem that Justice Breyer fails fully to confront
in his book, one that may undermine the effectiveness of his important
message. And that is this: even if they are willing to look, U.S. courts often
have no idea where or how to find the law Justice Breyer would have them
consider.
To be fair, this is not the fault of the judiciary alone. The legal education
system in the United States, until recently, offered little in the way of foreign or
international law training (with the limited exception of courses on English
common law). Many judges went to law school in the Cold War era, when they
were not encouraged to learn the bodies of law that Justice Breyer would have
them consult. Equally important, foreign and international legal sources are
difficult to find. Westlaw, Lexis, and other legal research tools commonly used
by U.S. lawyers offer little in the way of foreign law. And even if they did,
judges' chambers are not often well-equipped to read decisions in foreign
languages, much less appreciate their meaning in context. It is no coincidence
that when judges do look to foreign legal decisions, they look most often to
those written in English: decisions from the United Kingdom7 and Canada8
prominent among them.
As a result, U.S. courts -including the U.S. Supreme Court itself-are
often hostage to the litigants to bring the most relevant information about
foreign law to them.9 When a party makes a claim about foreign law, the Court
is often not in a position to evaluate that claim. When, for example, litigants
6. See id. at 176-78, 199-218.
7. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005) ("The United Kingdom's experience
bears particular relevance here in light of the historic ties between our countries and in light
of the Eighth Amendment's own origins.").
8. See, e.g., Knight v. Florida, 12O S. Ct. 459, 461 (1999) (denying certiorari) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing Kindler v. Minister ofJustice, [19911 2 S. C. R. 779, 838 (joint opinion)).
9. In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003), for example, the Court cited an amicus brief
as the only authority for the proposition that, "[o]ther nations, too, have taken action
consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in
intimate, consensual conduct."
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claimed that the Alien Tort Statute, the subject of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 1" was alone in the world in providing for civil liability for
violations of the law of nations, the Court was not well equipped to check the
accuracy of the claim. To help address this gap, one of us co-authored an
amicus brief to answer the claim.11
One may think that this is simply the nature of the adversarial process: the
courts rely on the parties to bring to light the material that best supports their
cause. But courts usually do not rely on the litigants and amici-who are
inevitably self-interested -for relevant legal materials to confirm or disconfirm
important claims. Federal judges have small armies of law clerks and law
librarians to do just that to test the litigants' claims against the relevant legal
materials. But the courts, including Supreme Court, are not well equipped to
do the same when it comes to claims about foreign and international law.
So what's a judge to do? One obvious solution would be for legislatures to
provide resources that would allow courts to better evaluate such claims. And,
indeed, we think there is a case for the Supreme Court, at the very least, to
devote more resources than it currently does to developing capacities that allow
the Justices to better evaluate litigants' foreign or international law claims.
There is also a gaping hole in the current information infrastructure that an
enterprising company ought to seek to fill -allowing lawyers and courts alike
to better access the resources they require to make the kinds of arguments
Breyer rightly emphasizes are so relevant in today's world.12
But these are long-term and potentially costly fixes. Is there something that
a judge who wants to answer Justice Breyer's call to arms can do right now to
ensure she is not receiving an incomplete or partial picture of foreign or
international law, whether as controlling or persuasive authority? The answer
is yes: U.S. courts could certify questions to foreign and international courts.
This may seem like a radical proposal, but in fact there is precedent for it.
When a U.S. state court confronts a dispositive but unsettled question of law
from another jurisdiction within the United States, it need not rely solely on
the arguments of the parties. Instead, one court may "certify," or submit, that
10. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
11. Supplemental Brief of Yale Law School Center for Global Legal Challenges as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 28-36, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.
1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (responding to the claim that the ATS was unusual in providing
for civil liability for violations of the law of nations).
12. Few foreign law databases provide the summaries, commentaries, headnotes, and other
helpful annotations that Lexis and Wesdaw do. Many international tribunals publish their
claims, filings, and decisions online. Again, however, users must navigate and search them
individually. Among the subscription databases with the best international law coverage are
the Oxford Reports on International Law and Brill's International Law and Human Rights.




question of law to the high court of another jurisdiction.13 The Supreme Court
has explained that certification of questions of law can "save time, energy, and
resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism."' Connecticut, for
instance, permits its supreme court to certify a question of law to, or receive a
certified question from, the highest court of another state or of a federally
recognized Native American tribe.1 5 Likewise, federal courts may certify a
question of state law to the appropriate state court, and since a 196o Supreme
Court opinion 16 inspired broader use of the practice, nearly all states have
adopted formal rules governing certification.17 This practice preserves comity
and facilitates sound adjudication, especially where important public policies
are at stake or the issue is likely to recur."'
Lower federal courts may also certify questions up to a higher court where
there a decisive question of law on which there is substantial difference of
opinion and where an immediate appeal could resolve the dispute more
quickly.19 In each case, courts may of course decline to respond to a certified
question.20 And while a court that certifies a question within the U.S. must
generally treat the response as authoritative, that would not necessarily be the
case in the event of a foreign or international certification.21 Nonetheless, this
sort of exchange could further the collaborative judicial problem solving
13. See Certifled Question, BLACK'S LAwDICTIONARY (1oth ed. 2014).
14. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386,391 (1974).
15. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5 i-i 9 9 b(c)-(d) (2o15).
16. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (196o) (vacating and remanding a federal
appellate decision for failing to take advantage of a Florida statute "which permits a federal
court to certify such a doubtful question of state law to the Supreme Court of Florida for its
decision").
17. Wendy L. Watson, McKinzie Craig & Daniel Orion Davis, Federal Court Certification of State-
Law Questions: Active Judicial Federalism, 28 JUST. SYST. J. 1 (2007) (describing evolution of
state certification procedures after Clay); Eric Eisenberg, Note, A Divine Comity: Certification
(at Last) in North Carolina, 58 DuiE L.J. 69 (2oo8) (discussing the fact that North Carolina
was the only state without a certification procedure as of 2oo8).
18. See, e.g., Parrot v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 338 F. 3d 140, 144 (2d Cir. 2003).
Depending on state law, this can be done by a U.S. court of appeals, see, e.g., Yesil v. Reno,
172 F. 3d 39 (2d Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (certifying a question to the New
York Court of Appeals), or a U.S. district court, see, e.g., Jagger v. Mohawk Mountain Ski
Area, No. 3 :olCV216 3 , 2002 WL 31433376 (D. Conn. Sept. 24, 2002) (certifying a state law
question to the Connecticut Supreme Court).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 129 2(b) (2o12) (permitting certification from a district court to a court of
appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (2o12) (permitting certification from a court of appeals to the
Supreme Court); Sup. CT. R. 19 (same).
20. See, e.g., Yesil v. Reno, 7o5 N.E.2d 655 (N.Y. 1998) (declining certification from the Second
Circuit).
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §§ 482, 483 (elaborating circumstances
in which a U.S. court need not respect a foreign judgment).
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encouraged by Justice Breyer. If state, federal, and tribal courts can
communicate with each other, why not U.S. and foreign or international
courts ?
Some federal judges appear to have warmed to the idea. Not long ago,
Judge Raymond Lohier suggested that, in "the context of cross-border
commercial disputes, there is every reason to develop a similar formal
certification process pursuant to which federal courts may certify an unsettled
and important question of foreign law to the courts of a foreign country. '
More recently, Judge Shira Scheindlin sounded a more urgent note. "Rule 44.1
requires me to determine the relevant foreign law in a dispute pending in a
U.S. court," she wrote. "While I can rely on all available sources, and credit
whatever expert testimony I choose, there is one thing I cannot do which
would be the most helpful. I cannot certify these unsettled questions of
Russian law to the Russian courts."'23
But local rules are not created by the legislature -Congress has authorized
courts to adopt these rules themselves.' This problem is therefore entirely
within the power of each federal court to change.25 Nothing prevents a federal
court from amending its local rules to permit certification to foreign or
international courts. And even in the absence of a local rule, courts in an
appropriate case may exercise their authority under the All Writs Act, 6 or
pursuant to their inherent judicial powers simply to ask a foreign or
international court whether it will accept a certified question. 7 In other words,
U.S. courts already have the power to request the views of a foreign or
international court, either regarding a dispositive point of law in a U.S. case or
even in the broader, consultative manner envisioned by Justice Breyer.
One might object, as critics of certification within the U.S. have done, that
the practice can cause delays in adjudication, unduly burden the court to which
a question is certified, and generate advisory opinions in response. None of
22. Terra Firma Invs. (GP) 2 Ltd. v. Citigroup, Inc., 716 F. 3 d 296, 301 (2d Cir. 2013) (Lohier, J.,
concurring).
23. Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits Int'l B.V., 61 F. Supp. 3d 372, 386
(S.D.N.Y. 2014), notice of appeal pending.
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071; see also FED. R. APP. P. 47 (authorizing adoption of local rules); FED. R.
Crv. P. 83 (same).
25. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Note, supra note 17, at 81 & n.8o (noting that South Carolina adopted a
certification procedure by court rule).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012). The All Writs Act was enacted in the First Judiciary Act of 1789
and has long been recognized as a broad grant of interstitial authority to issue all orders
necessary to the sound adjudication of cases over which a court has proper jurisdiction.
27. Notably, some state courts have concluded that it was within their inherent judicial powers
to answer a certified question, even in the absence of a state statute expressly authorizing the
practice. See, e.g., Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mutual Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 1144 (Idaho
1983); In re Elliott, 446 P.2d 347 (Wash. 1968).
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these objections have stifled the certification process in the United States,
however, and there is no reason to believe courts could not manage a foreign or
international version equally well. Judges are well-positioned to determine
when delay is sufficiently prejudicial to a litigant to proceed with an
adjudication even absent a response to a certified question; courts burdened by
the receipt of certified questions can decline the certification; and the existence
of a live dispute between parties in the certifying court tends to prevent a
purely advisory opinion by another court (if that court's own rules even
prevent their issuance).
Of course, we do not pretend that our proposal is a complete fix for the
problem we have identified. As already noted, simply because U.S. courts make
a request does not mean a foreign court must respond. If answers are provided,
litigants may disagree with them (and, indeed, they should be permitted to
offer their views in response). Moreover, the availability of certification should
not absolve courts of the responsibility to become better informed and to
develop resources that allow them to evaluate foreign and international law
claims with the same rigor they do domestic law claims. There may be other
avenues for obtaining information, as well, that judges might explore-for
example, appointing an amicus to provide expert briefing on specific questions
of foreign or international law 8 or issuing a letter rogatory to a foreign or
international court.29 But even if it is not a complete fix, certification offers
courts an important tool. It also has symbolic value that other solutions might
not. Certifying questions to foreign and international courts would
demonstrate that U.S. judges value the informed opinions of their counterparts
the world over.
The U.S. Supreme Court could lead the way. In the 195os, the Court
developed the practice of "calling for the views of the Solicitor General" when,
28. The Supreme Court, in particular, can appoint expert amici and can use the process of
"calling for the views of the Solicitor General" to obtain information on the content of
foreign or international law. Indeed, the Office of Foreign Law at the Department of Justice
(OFL) employs foreign lawyers to defend U.S. interests abroad, and those lawyers are in a
particularly good position to opine on the content of foreign law. The Solicitor General
would likely coordinate an answer from OFL and the Legal Adviser's Office at State in
preparing its brief.
29. See Letter Rogatory, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (loth ed. 2014) (defining a letter rogatory as a
"document issued by one court to a foreign court" to facilitate service of process or taling of
evidence); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781(a)(2), 1782(a) (2o12) (detailing procedures for issuing
and receiving letters rogatory); FED. R. Civ. P. 28 (b) (i) (B), (b) (2) (permitting discovery by
letters rogatory); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247-50 (2012)
(discussing the development of letters rogatory). But a letter rogatory is not traditionally
used to answer questions of law, and the device is often cumbersome. See, e.g., Offices of the
U.S. Attorneys, Letters Rogatory, U.S. DEP'T JUST. § 275, http://www.justice.gov/usam
/criminal-resource-manual-275-letters-rogatory [http://perma.cc/G 7 DA-HOYZ] ("Letters
rogatory are customarily transmitted via the diplomatic channel, a time-consuming means
of transmission.").
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for practical, political, or other reasons, the Justices sought help before
deciding petitions for certiorari or cases on the merits.3" This practice fostered a
productive dialogue between the judiciary and the executive branch while
facilitating the work of the Court.3 No rule of the Supreme Court governs this
practice. Now, in the still early years of the twenty-first century, the U.S.
Supreme Court could innovate again, this time by certifying a question to, or
requesting the views of, a foreign or international court. In this way, the Court
could begin to invite a truly informed and engaged dialogue with the world.
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125 YALE L.J. F. 156 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/asking-for
-directions.
30. One of the earliest instances of a "CVSG" occurred in the landmark school desegregation
case from Little Rock, Arkansas, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), a decision influential in
Justice Breyer's own conception of the judicial role. See Aaron v. Cooper, 358 U.S. 27 (1958)
(Misc. Order) (calling for the views of the Solicitor General following oral argument); see
also Stephen G. Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: The Yale Lectures, 120 YALE L.J. 1999,
20o6-1o (2011) (discussing Cooper v. Aaron).
31. Stefanie A. Lepore, The Development of the Supreme Court Practice of Callingfor the Views of the
Solicitor General, 35 J. SuP. CT. HIST. 35 (2010).
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